Punitive Damages: On the Path to A Principled Approach by Mallor, Jane & Roberts, Barry S.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 50 | Issue 4 Article 14
1-1999
Punitive Damages: On the Path to A Principled
Approach
Jane Mallor
Barry S. Roberts
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Jane Mallor and Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to A Principled Approach, 50 Hastings L.J. 1001 (1999).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol50/iss4/14
Punitive Damages: On the Path to A
Principled Approach?
by
JANE MALLOR* and BARRY S. ROBERTS**
We are very pleased that Hastings Law Journal has chosen an
article on punitive damages to appear in this Fiftieth Anniversary
issue. In the twenty years since Punitive Damages: Toward a
Principled Approach' was first published, punitive damages remain a
significant issue of law and public policy. In fact, judicial, legislative,
and scholarly interest in punitive damages has surged in the
intervening period. Written at the beginning of the tort and civil
justice reform era, our article suggested practices and standards
designed to ensure that punitive damages were applied in a way that
used but did not abuse their significant power to punish and deter
reprehensible conduct. 2
Today the debate over punitive damages has generally, although
not completely,3 shifted from the historical question whether punitive
damages should be allowed at all to the question whether they are
being abused. It has been argued that there is a punitive damages
crisis and that the amounts of punitive damages verdicts are out of
control.4 As a result, two important categories of developments have
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1. Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980).
2. See id. at 663-69.
3. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998). This article was strongly
rebutted in Theodore Eisenberg, Measuring The Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages, 87
GEO. L.J. 347 (1998), and David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87
GEO. L.J. 359 (1998). All but four states allow punitive damages, and one of those four
states does allow exemplary damages. See Viscusi, supra, at 288; Eisenberg, supra, at 348.
4. See generally Viscusi, supra note 3. See also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 42-64 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Probably in response to the debate
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affected punitive damages. First, punitive damages have been
subjected to a variety of legislative reforms that are designed to
remove the incentive for plaintiffs to press for punitive damages and
suppress the opportunity for abusive awards. Second, the U.S.
Supreme Court has planted its flag on punitive damages
jurisprudence in a series of cases that analyze the constitutional
implications of punitive damages awards. This line of cases
admonishes judges to provide not just meaningful, but rigorous
review of punitive damages awards.5
To what extent have these developments placed us on the path to
a principled approach to punitive damages? This essay sketches the
current state of punitive damages law and practice. It examines the
relationship of the developments mentioned above to the principled
approach that we suggested twenty years ago, and asks, where have
we progressed, where have we strayed and what remains to be done?
A. The Demonizing of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are designed to "aid courts in enforcing
established norms of conduct."'6 They are directed at behavior that
intentionally or callously flouts the law and the interests of others and
warrants more than the accountability of compensating the plaintiff.
Through the mechanism of an award of damages that is by its nature
excessive-exceeding the amount necessary to compensate the
plaintiff for the harm caused by the defendants7 and exceeding other
awards for similar harms so as to make the defendant and others like
him take notice-punitive damages seeks to affirm the social order
and discourage the defendant and others who are similarly situated
from committing the behavior. It stands to reason that this brand of
punishment and deterrence is most valuable where the law would
otherwise provide little other disincentive for the objectionable
about the role of punitive damages in the tort "crisis," scholars have undertaken empirical
studies that revealed much more information about the practice and effect of punitive
damages than was available in 1980. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive
Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15 (1998).
5. See Bruce J. McKee, The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive
Damages Litigation: Observations from a Participant, 48 ALA. L. REV. 175, 225
(1996)("Perhaps the primary purpose of the BMW majority was just to send a general
'signal' to lower courts to tighten the reins on punitive awards.").
6. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 1, at 647.
7. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 873-74 (1998)(noting that "a crucial question for
consideration is whether injurers sometimes escape liability for harms for which they are
responsible. If they do, the level of liability imposed on them when they are found liable
needs to exceed compensatory damages so that, on average, they will pay for the harm
that they cause.").
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conduct.8 An example of this type of situation would be one in which
a vast economic disparity between the defendant and the plaintiff-
such as between a large corporate defendant and a consumer
plaintiff-would otherwise make it safe for the defendant to ignore
the plaintiff's interests.9 The strength of the punitive award lies in a
measure of unpredictability. If a punitive damages award can be
known with certainty in advance of the conduct, the very sort of
callousness that is to be corrected by a punitive award would be
facilitated; the defendant would be able to calculate his maximum
exposure to liability and determine whether to disregard the interests
of the plaintiff.'0 The punitive award provides an incentive to
individuals to act as "private attorney[s] general" and bring cases
warranting such awards to the courts." New opportunities for the
imposition of punitive damages, such as the inclusion of a possible
punitive damages remedy in the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act, indicate that the legal system still considers punitive damages a
useful complement to other forms of enforcement.'2
However, the doctrine's strengths are potentially its weaknesses.
The imprecision of standards for punitive damages, the windfall
received by the plaintiff, and the imposition of large, sometimes
"breathtaking,"'13  awards against corporate defendants have
permitted tort reformers to portray punitive damages as being
weapon of abuse wielded by greedy plaintiffs and poorly
superintended by ineffectual trial courts. It has been stated that
"punitive damages are out of control .... The widespread
dissatisfaction with the role of punitive damages in the liability system
is well established."'14 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor appears to have
8. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 1, at 648.
9. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1276-77
(1993)(arguing that the award of punitive damages is a "necessary remedy against the
abuse of power by economic elites" and stating that "[t]he doctrine of punitive damages is
one of the few remedies that can constrain a giant corporation that is willing and able to
take advantage of its less powerful 'adversaries').
10. See id. at 1277.
11. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 1, at 649-50.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (1994). The Supreme Court recently reviewed the
standards for imposing punitive damages in employment discrimination claims. See
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,__ U.S. _., 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999)(holding, inter
alia, that in a Title VII employment discrimination claim, an employer's conduct need not
be independently "egregious" to satisfy 1981's requirements for a punitive damages
award).
13. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996)(describing the award
against BMW in an Alabama state court).
14. Viscusi, supra note 3, at 333-334. See also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 7, at 870
("One of the more controversial features of the American legal system is the imposition of
punitive damages.").
adopted this view, as she has said that "[o]ur cases attest to the wildly
unpredictable results and glaring unfairness that characterize
common-law punitive damage procedures."' 5 Former Vice President
Dan Quayle stated that "the current approach to punitive
damages... generate[s] disproportionately high awards in a random
and capricious manner.' 6
In his comprehensive review of punitive damages, however,
Professor Michael Rustad presents convincing data that such claims
are horror stories and are not supported by the evidence.' 7 Professor
Rustad reviewed nine empirical studies18 on punitive damages trends
15. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 49 (1991)(O'Conner,J., dissenting).
16. Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559,564 (1992).
17. See Rustad, supra note 4, at 17-18.
18. See id Prof. Rustad lists the nine empirical studies reviewed in his article as
follows:
1) The RAND Institute for Civil Justice study of jury verdicts in two
counties ... MARK PETERSON ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987) (R-3311-ICJ)... ;
2) The American Bar Foundation study of jury verdicts in eleven
states... Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in
Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990)... ; 3) The GAO report
on verdicts in five states in 1983-1985... U.S. GEN., ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE,
CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES,
GAO/HRD-89-99, at 2-3 (1989) ... ; 4) Landes and Posner's study of
federal and state appellate cases published in West reporters...
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) ... William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct.
1986, at 33... ; 5) Rustad and Koenig's study of three decades of
punitive damages awards in products liability... Michael Rustad, In
Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992)... ; 6)
Rustad and Koenig's study of twenty-five years of punitive damage
awards in medical malpractice,... Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig,
Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting
Amoral Corporations, not "Moral Monsters," 47 RUTGERS L. REV.
975 (1995) ... ; 7) The Department of Justice, National Center for
State Courts, and Cornell University Civil Justice survey of 1992
verdicts... CAROL DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997)[herinafter Eisenberg et al.,
Predictability] ... ; 8) The RAND Institute of Civil Justice's follow-up
study of punitive damages ... DEBORAH HENSLER & ERIK MOLLER,
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
PRELIMINARY DATA FROM COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS AND SAN
FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA (1995) (DRU-1014-ICJ) ... ERIK MOLLER,
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and concluded that "[e]very empirical study of punitive damages
demonstrates that there is no nationwide punitive damages crisis."1 9
In fact, he stated that the clear convergence of findings is that the
"overall rate and level of punitive damages [are] low. °20 Professor
Theodore Eisenberg adds that "[a]ll credible sources suggest that
punitive damage awards are rare, '21 and that concerns are greatly
exaggerated.22 Finally, Professor Luban adds,
it is difficult to make the case that punitive damages are out
of control. You would never know it from the voluminous
tort reform literature.., but study after study confirms that
punitive damages are awarded in only a minuscule
proportion of accident cases-somewhere in the vicinity of 2-
4% of plaintiffs' victories.23
In fact, the research also reveals that punitive damages are most
frequently imposed in business tort and intentional tort cases and not
in personal injury cases24 and that they are substantially and
significantly correlated to the size of the compensatory damages
awarded.2
Nevertheless, the popular perception that punitive damages were
out of control led nearly all of the state legislatures to enact some
form of limitation on the imposition and award of punitive damages.2 6
B. Legislatively Imposed Limits Upon Punitive Damages
There have been an array of legislative strategies designed to
control or limit the imposition or award of punitive damages. These
measures include:
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS
SINCE 1985 (1996) ... ; 9) The American Bar Foundation follow-up
study of punitive damages... STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN,
CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995).
Id (footnotes included).
19. Rustad, supra note 4, at 69.
20. Id. at 20.
21. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 348.
22. See id. at 348.
23. Luban, supra note 3, at 360. See also Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 18,
at 629.
24. See Rustad, supra note 4, at 69.
25. See id. at 31 (citing Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 18, at 637-639).
26. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19(1996)(Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 18, at 624; Lisa M. Sharkey, Judge
or Jury: Who Should Assess Punitive Damages?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1996);
Note, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson:
Blazing the Judicial Trails in Punitive Damage Reform, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 401, 448-457
(1997) [hereinafter Toledo Note].
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(1) Caps on Punitive Damage Awards
To prevent excessive and uncontrolled punitive damages, a
number of states have enacted statutory caps on punitive damages
awards. These statutes establish a maximum punitive award, generally
ranging from $50,000 to $5,000,000.27
(2) State Recovery of Punitive Damages Awards
Presumably to reduce the incentive for plaintiffs to press for
punitive awards, several states have enacted legislation either giving
the state a share of punitive damages awards or permitting state
agencies to seek punitive damages. 28 These statutes provide for a
proportion of the punitive damage award ranging from thirty-five to
100 percent to be turned over to the state.29
(3) Bifurcated Trials
To prevent inappropriate awards of punitive damages that might
result if the jury had access to financial information about the
defendant during the liability phase of a trial, a number of states, as
well as many federal courts, have adopted the practice of bifurcating
trials to have separate hearings for the determination of liability and
punitive damages.30 In some states the bifurcation is automatic, while
in others it is dependent upon the request by one of the parties.31 The
states also vary as to whether the amount of punitive damages award
is in the discretion of the judge or the jury.32
(4) Heightened Burden of Proof
Another popular device for reigning in the frivolous imposition
of punitive damages is to require a heightened burden of proof for the
recovery of punitive damages. 33 Most of the states that have enacted
such a rule provide for "clear and convincing" evidence, although at
27. Examples of these statutes are presented in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 615-16 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). See also, Sharkey, supra note 26, at 1089
n.1; Toledo Note, supra note 26, at 405, 451-52.
28. For a discussion of these statutes, see James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State
Trends and Developments, 14 REV. LITIG. 419,436-43 (1995).
29. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 616-18 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); Toledo Note, supra note
26, at 405, 453-56.
30. See McKown, supra note 28, at 446-53.
31. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 618-19; Toledo Note, supra note 26, at 450-51.
32. Sharkey, supra note 26, at 1089 n.4.
33. See McKown, supra note 28, at 453-58 for a discussion of requirement of an
elevated burden of proof for punitive damages. The author reports that twenty state
legislatures and a number of state courts now require a standard of proof higher than the
preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 455.
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least one state requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."34
(5) Required Proportionality Between Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Awards
A further limit on punitive damages is a required proportionality
between the compensatory award and the punitive award. This is
sometimes expressed as a ratio provided in legislation or by a
standard applied by state courts.35
These statutory reforms generally make punitive damages harder
to recover, reduce the maximum exposure of defendants and make
that exposure more predictable, and reduce the incentive that
plaintiffs have to expend resources pursuing punitive damages. This
makes life easier for defendants, but it seems likely that it does so at
the cost of the deterrent function of punitive damages.
C. Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages Awards
In three decisions in the 1990s, the United States Supreme Court
addressed itself to the limits that the Due Process Clause places on
the amounts of punitive damages awards.3 6 Judging from the lack of
continuity among the cases and the sometimes splintered decisions,
achieving consensus on this issue has been difficult.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,37 the Court
considered a punitive damages award of four times compensatory
damages and 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
plaintiff in a case from Alabama,38 a punitive damages "hot spot. '39 In
Haslip, the Court focused on the procedures used to arrive at the
punitive damages award, finding the defendant's Due Process
interests to have been adequately served by a process in which the
jury's discretion was limited by standards given at trial and by post-
trial judicial review that applied standards that the court found to
impose "sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint. '40
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,41 the
Supreme Court shifted its focus from scrutinizing the process used for
determining punitive damages to scrutinizing the product of such a
process, the amount of the punitive damages award. In TXO, the
34. IdL, at 455.
35. See id. at 445-46.
36. See BMW, 517 U.S. 559; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 509 U.S.
443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
37. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
38. See id. at 23.
39. Rustad, supra note 4, at 35.
40. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21.
41. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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Court established that the Due Process Clause prohibits a state from
imposing a grossly excessive punishment on a tortfeasor,42 but it did
not find that punitive damages were excessive under the facts of the
case.43
The Court's most recent and most detailed analysis of the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards was made in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore,44 another case from Alabama. BMW
involved the imposition of a $4,000 compensatory damages and $4
million punitive damages award on the American distributor of BMW
automobiles for its nondisclosure of predelivery repainting of new
cars.45 In its review of the original $4 million punitive damages award,
the Supreme Court of Alabama had applied a seven-factor review
standard referred to as the "Green Oil standards,"46 after the
Alabama case that had first adopted those standards of post-trial
judicial review of punitive damages.47 The Green Oil standards base
review of punitive awards on the following considerations:
The relationship between the harm that is likely to occur from the
defendant's conduct as well as the harm that has actually occurred;
The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct;
The profitability of the defendant's conduct;
The financial position of the defendant;
The costs of the litigation;
Any criminal sanctions that have been imposed on the defendant,
which should operate in mitigation of the award;
Other civil actions against the defendant based on the same
conduct, which should operate in mitigation of the award.48
These post-trial review standards are very similar to the ones we
identified with a principled approach in our original article,49 and, in
fact, are the exact standards that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Haslip,
had found to provide a "sufficiently definite and meaningful
constraint" on a jury's discretion to award punitive damages and to
have "real effect when applied by the Alabama Supreme Court to
jury awards."50 In the Alabama review of BMW, the Alabama
42. See id. at 453-54.
43. See id. at 462.
44. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
45. See id. at 563-67.
46. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619,622 (Ala. 1994).
47. See Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989).
48. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 624 (Ala. 1994)(quoting Aetna Life
Ins. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1062 (Ala. 1987)).
49. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 1, at 667-69.
50. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991)(O'Conner, J. dissenting).
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Supreme Court reduced the amount of the verdict that reflected
losses suffered in other states,5' but after a review of the application
of the Green Oil standards, still found that a punitive award of $2
million was justified.52
In its decision in BMW, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
punitive damages award not only could be so large that it violates the
Due Process Clause, but that the award under review was, in fact,
unconstitutionally excessive.53 The BMW case represents the first
time the Supreme Court has found a state punitive damages award to
be unconstitutional under the federal Due Process Clause.54
According to the Court, the "elementary notions of fairness"
imbedded in the Due Process Clause require that a defendant receive
notice of both the conduct that will subject him to punishment and
the severity of that punishment.55 The Court identified three
"guideposts" for determining the magnitude of punitive damages of
which a defendant might have notice.56 All three guideposts militate
for a proportionality between the defendant's conduct and the
punitive award.
The first guidepost, which the Court indicated was perhaps the
most important, is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct.57 The Court provided a brief taxonomy of reprehensibility
and indicated that the amount of a punitive award should be in
proportion to both the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's interest that the conduct implicated. 5 8 In this taxonomy,
conduct that threatens the health and safety of others is more serious
than that which affects only economic interests,59 conduct that harms
the economic interests of financially vulnerable people is more
serious than conduct that harms the economic interests of the
prosperous, 6°  "trickery and deceit" are more serious than
negligence, 61 and repeated, conscious wrongdoing is more serious
51. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619,627-29 (Ala. 1994).
52. See id. at 629.
53. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,574 (1996).
54. Sabrina C. Turner, The Shadow of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 1998
Wis. L. REv. 427,427.
55. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
56. See id. at 574-75. The Court did not specify what the relationship is between the
three guideposts and the concept of notice to the defendant, but it stated that "each of the
[three guideposts] ... indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the
magnitude of the sanction.., lead us to the conclusion that the $2 million award against
BMW is grossly excessive .... " Id.
57. See id. at 575.
58. See id. at 575-580.
59. See id. at 576 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,292-93 (1983)).
60. See id. at 576.
61. Id.(quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
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than arguably legal conduct that stops when the wrongfulness
becomes known.62
The second guidepost is the reasonableness of the ratio between
punitive damages and the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff.63 The
ratio is measured as the relationship between the punitive damages
award and "the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as
well as the harm that actually has occurred." 64 The Court rejected the
application of a simple formula for the ratio, noting that there would
be times when a high ratio was warranted to punish and deter
egregious conduct, such as where the defendant's conduct results in
small economic damages or where the injury is noneconomic in
nature or otherwise difficult to detect.65 However, the 500 to one
relationship between the punitive award and the actual harm done to
the plaintiff in the BMW case was "breathtaking," while not
supported by any of the rationales for such a disproportionate ratio.66
The third guidepost used to determine constitutionally excessive
awards is a comparison of the punitive damages to "the civil or
criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable
misconduct." 67 That is, the punitive award should be commensurate
with criminal and civil sanctions imposed by legislatures for
comparable conduct.68 The point of this comparison is to give the
potential defendant notice as to the magnitude of the penalty that
might be exacted for committing the objectionable act.69 After
examining the application of the three guideposts to the facts of the
case, the Court held that the damages were grossly excessive and
transcended the constitutional limit.70 It reversed the case and
remanded it to the Alabama Supreme Court.71
D. Post-Trial Review of Punitive Damages after BMW
The BMW case did not make clear whether the Court's objection
was to the standards used by the Alabama courts or to the way in
(1993)).
62. See idL at 577, 579.
63. See id at 580-81.
64. Id. at 581(quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
460 (1993)).
65. See id at 582.
66. 1& at 580-84.
67. Id.
68. See idL
69. See idL at 584 (stating that "[n]one of these statutes would provide an out-of-state
distributor with fair notice that the first violation-or, indeed the first 14 violations-of its
provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion dollar penalty").
70. See id at 585-86.
71. See id. at 586.
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which the Alabama court had applied its standards. Two of the
Supreme Court's guideposts, reprehensibility and ratio,72 are also two
of the Green Oil standards.73 The third guidepost, sanctions for
comparable misconduct, is also contemplated in the Green Oil
standards, although under Green Oil, other sanctions are to be
considered in mitigation of the punitive damages 74 whereas in the
Supreme Court's scheme, the function of considering sanctions for
comparable misconduct is to provide a standard of proportionality for
the punitive award. 75 Did the Supreme Court intend to foreclose the
use of standards other than the three guideposts in post-trial review
of punitive awards or did it intend to convey that the lower court had
not adequately weighed the three guideposts?
On remand, the Supreme Court of Alabama interpreted the
Supreme Court's BMW opinion as not excluding the consideration of
other factors that might bear on the question of excessiveness and
concluded that the Court had objected to the way in which the
Alabama court had applied the factors, rather than to the Green Oil
standards themselves.7 6 The Alabama court drew the conclusion that
the Supreme Court wanted lower courts to be more rigorous in their
application of the reprehensibility, ratio, and comparable sanctions
standards, 77 and it proceeded to do just that, reducing Gore's punitive
damages award to $50,000.78
E. The Current State of the Law and a Principled Approach
The practice and standards of punitive damages need to be
calibrated in a way that balances the interests of the defendant and
society: protecting the defendant's interests by ensuring that
punishment is warranted and appropriate, and protecting society's
interest by assuring that the punitive remedy retains its deterrent
effect. Our original article suggested that this balance be struck by a
combination of substantive review standards and procedural
reforms.79
Statutory tort reforms of punitive damages that arbitrarily make
such damages more difficult to recover (elevated standards of proof),
specify a maximum amount of punitive damages (damage caps), or
make punitive damages calculable in advance (required ratio between
72. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
73. See Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218,223-24 (Ala. 1989).
74. See id. at 224.
75. See id. at 583-85.
76. See BMV of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507,509 (Ala. 1997).
77. See id2 at 510.
78. See id. at 515.
79. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 1, at 663-69.
compensatory and punitive awards) fail to strike this balance because
they weaken the deterrent effect of punitive damages. Statutory
measures allowing the state to collect some or all of a punitive award
reduce or remove the plaintiff's incentive to act as a private attorney
general, and thus weaken the possibility that punitive damages will be
used to accomplish deterrence.
Statutory provisions for bifurcated trials are, however, a positive
step toward a principled approach in that they help to avoid
compromise on the liability decision and overly harsh penalties that
might result from passion or prejudice. We remain persuaded,
however, that principled results would be more likely to result if the
judge rather than the jury, assessed punitive damages. A study on
bifurcation indicates that larger punitive damages awards tended to
result from bifurcated trials in the federal system than unified trials,
resulting possibly from the psychology of having all the bad news
presented at once.80 It seems unlikely that this inflationary effect
would occur if the judge, rather than the jury, were assessing the
damages.81 Certainly, it would seem a more efficient process than the
procedure of charging the jury with one group of standards, then
providing post-trial review of the jury's award using another group of
standards, followed perhaps by a meta-review by a higher appellate
court of the standards used during post-trial review. The proposed
scheme has constitutional implications as a potential violation of state
and federal right to jury trial,8 but the outcome of such a challenge
has not been fully developed at this point and is one of the issues
regarding punitive damages that remains to be clarified.
The Supreme Court has made some helpful contributions to the
principled approach to punitive damages. Its taxonomy of
reprehensibility bolsters a principled approach in that it provides
useful standards for lower courts to use in considering whether
punitive damages are warranted, and if so, to what extent. Its
rejection of a precise, mathematical approach to determining the ratio
of punitive damages to actual and threatened losses83 is to be
80. See Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical
Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 297,335-36.
81. We can probably expect that judges would be somewhat more restrained in the
assessment of punitive awards, because they frequently reduce the amount of punitive
damages awards. See Mark Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages
and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1408-09, 1409 nn.75 and 79 (1993).
82. See Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397,401 (Ohio 1994)(holding such a
statute to be unconstitutional under Ohio's Constitution); but see Smith v. Printup, 866
P.2d 994 (Kan. 1993)(upholding Kansas' statute). For'an excellent overall discussion of
this issue, which is beyond the scope of this article, see Sharkey, supra note 26.
83. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)("[W]e have
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple
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applauded, because it permits punitive damages to remain something
of a "wild card" preventing a defendant from making a certain,
advance calculation of profit and cost.s4 In fact, in some instances
where the compensatory damages may be extremely low, but the
conduct so evil and the potential of harm to society is great, punitive
damages should be disproportionately high in order to encourage the
plaintiff to act as a private attorney general.85 Additionally, if the
underlying message of BMW is to encourage trial and appellate court
judges to "ride herd" on punitive damages awards and provide
meaningful judicial review of such awards, 86 that, too, is a step on the
path of the principled approach.
On the negative side, however, the Court's new requirement of
proportionality between the punitive award and civil and criminal
sanctions for comparable conduct threatens to substantially dilute the
deterrent effect of punitive damages, both because it makes the
amount of possible punitive damages more predictable than is
desirable for striking the balance between the defendant's and
society's interests, and because punitive damages are useful in many
situations precisely because other civil and criminal penalties are
inadequate to deter the defendant's conduct.
In addition, the BMW opinion's lack of clarity about whether the
three guideposts supplant other standards for excessiveness or are
standards to be emphasized in excessiveness reviews creates the
danger that lower courts might under-assess punitive damages. For
example, three Green Oil standards not mentioned by the court in
BMW-profitability of the conduct, defendant's financial position,
and costs of litigation-are standards that check whether the award of
punitive damages is adequate to deter a particular defendant and
incent a particular plaintiff. The only one of these standards discussed
in BMW was referred to obliquely when the Court stated that
[t]he fact that BMW is a large corporation rather than an
impecunious individual does not diminish its entitlement to
fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on
the conduct of its business. Indeed, its status as an active
participant in the national economy implicates the federal
mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the
punitive award.").
84. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 1, at 666. Almost all the courts that have
considered the notion of a precise mathematical formula have rejected it. See, e.g., BMW
517 U.S. at 582; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); Denesha v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 161 F.3d 491, 504 (8th Cir. 1998); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 809 (Utah 1991).
85. See Wahba v. H & N Prescription Ctr., Inc. 539 F. Supp. 352,358 (E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n., 743 P.2d 1323, 1338 (Cal. 1987);
Schmidt v. Pine Tree Land Dev. Co., 631 P.2d 1373,1374-75 (Or. 1981).
86. See McKee, supra note 5, at 225.
interest in preventing individual States from imposing undue
burdens on interstate commerce. '87
The deterrent power of punitive damages would indeed be
weakened if lower courts interpreted BMW to mean that they should
no longer attempt to ensure that a punitive damages award was
adequate to arouse the defendant's attention and to require him to
disgorge any profits realized by its reprehensible conduct.
Conclusion
It remains our belief that the criteria proposed in our original
article along with a bifurcated trial in which the judge awards punitive
damages would result in a principled outcome in cases in which
punitive damages are sought. Of course, as seen in BMW, the criteria
can be misapplied or at least are capable of divergent applications.
Still, the criteria balance the interests of the defendant and society,
and if coupled with the kind of judicial supervision demanded by
BMW, the standards should provide the opportunity for meaningful
review. Better still would be to remove the jury from the assessment
of the punitive award. A bifurcated procedure in which the jury
decides whether punitive damages are appropriate and the judge
assesses the amount of punitive damages can engage the judge's
experience in imposing sanctions, balancing competing interests, and
making public policy judgments while engaging the jury's authority to
speak for the community about the necessity for a punitive remedy.88
The composite effect of statutory reforms and the Supreme
Court's line of cases ending with BMW seems to us likely to suppress
punitive damages awards and weaken the remedy. Much work has
been done in the past twenty years to ensure that punitive damages
are not awarded in an arbitrary or casual manner. Today it seems that
the balance of concern has shifted to the side of the defendant's
interests, and that greater attention to standards and practices that
accommodate both society's and defendants' interests are needed to
retain punitive damages as a valuable partner in enforcing society's
norms.
87. BMW, 517 U.S. at 585.
88. See Sharkey, supra note 26, at 1129; Richard Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence:
The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 96 (1985);
Griffen B. Bell & Perry E. Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System, 22 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1 (1987); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA.
L. Rev. 975,1003-07 (1989).
[Vol. 50HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
